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Ricoeur and Historiography

"A hypothesis then comes to mind. Does the historian, insofar as he does history by bringing it to the level of scholarly discourse, not mime in a creative way the interpretive gesture by which those who make history attempt to understand themselves and their world? This hypothesis is particularly plausible for a pragmatic conception of historiography that tries not to separate representations from the practices by which social agents set up the social bond and include multiple identities within it. If so, there would indeed be a mimetic relation between the operation of representing as the moment of doing history, and the represented object as the moment of making history.

Furthermore, historians, little habituated to situating their historical discourse in terms of the critical prolonging of personal and collective memory, are not led to bringing together these two uses of the term 'representation' in relation to what I have called a more primitive one, unless it is in the order of thematic reflection, at least as regards the constitution of the relation to time, that is, in terms of the act of remembering. This too has its ambition, its claim, that of representing the past faithfully. The phenomenology of memory, from the time of Plato and Aristotle, has proposed one key for the interpretation of the mnemonic phenomenon, namely, the power of memory to make present an absent thing that happened previously. Presence, absence, anteriority, and representation thus form the first conceptual chain of discourse about memory. The ambition of the faithfulness of memory would thus precede that of truth by history, whose theory remains to be worked out.

Can this hermeneutic key open the secret of the represented object, before penetrating that of the operation of representing?

Some historians have thought about this, without leaving behind the framework of the history of representations. Fro them, what is important is actualizing the reflective resources of social agents in their attempts to understand themselves and their world. This is the approach recommended and practiced by Clifford Geertz in The Interpretation of Cultures, where as a sociologist he confines himself to conceptualizing the outlines of self-understanding immanent to a culture. The historian can also undertake to do this. But can he do so without providing the analytic instrument that this spontaneous self-understanding lacks? The answer can only be negative. Yet the work thus applied to the idea of representation does not surpass the privilege of conceptualization that the historian exercises from one end to the other of the historiographical operation, hence from reading the archives to writing the book, in passing through explanation/understanding and its literary organization. Therefore there is nothing shocking in introducing into the discourse on the represented object fragments of analysis and of definition borrowed from another discursive domain than history" (Ricoeur 2006:228-229).

Ricoeur, Paul
2006[2004] Memory, History, Forgetting. Kathleen Blamey & David Pellauer, trans. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

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Spirit and Nature

“In principle the possibility of contrasting one attitude with another rests on the more radical possibility of detaching oneself from every attitude, that is to say of performing the phenomenological reduction. This first act shatters the spell of the natural attitude and thus makes another attitude possible. Before ever establishing the priority of one attitude over the other, the phenomenologist renders possible another attiude through the primordial liberty of the ‘ultimate subject’ (letze Subjekt) for which nature is not more than the pure ‘sense’ of the acts constitutive of nature. Thus, he accounts for the difference between the two types of science by the difference between the attitudes in which they are rooted. He shows how to simplify the perspectives on man by means of changing attitudes, the phenomenologist being the disinterested spectator of all attitudes. Under his disinterested gaze, interested practices lose their naivete and with it their attractive power and hence their exclusive believing in the ‘being’ they consider.

Let us, then, make the sense ‘person’ appear. Will the phenomenologist create this new Idea by dialectic, or will he draw it by deduction from what has already been said? Not one line in the third part authorizes us to interpret constitution in either of these ways. Husserl always unfolds the complex intentions of consciousness, beginning from a sense already there in which they intersect. Hence, we read the opposition of the naturalistic world and the personalistic world in the appearance of man himself.

It must be said first that the sense of the soul is different from the sense of the person. I see a soul ‘in’ its body, its sense of touch in its hand, its joy in its face. I see the psyche well up and be reabsorbed on the level of bodies which are themselves inserted into the texture of things. Expectations and recollections roll forth and beat their lived time against objective world-time with its coincidences and intervals. Social institutions lend themselves to being grasped as a lay of stimuli and responses on the level of the behavior of the animate body. There is nothing in man that cannot be treated in a psycho-physiological fashion. Thus, in the natural attitude man falls back into zoology. Such are the tendencies of a study of sensoriality and localization; to be animate is truly to be an animal (Husserl sometimes speaks of animalia). However, we are not in this attitude when we live together, when we speak, when we exchange experiences, or when we live in the family, the state, the church, etc. Here we do not see man s a being of nature but rather as a being of culture. We do not notice the animal when we pay attention to the person. This is why a psychology of sociality, which limits itself to being an interpsychology where man is related to man as a stimulus having psychic functions, is deficient in its relation to man” (Ricoeur 1967:69-70).

Ricoeur, Paul
1967 Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology. Edware G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree, trans. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

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