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Concordant Discordance

“From this correlation between action and character in a narrative there results a dialectic internal to the character which is the exact corollary of the dialectic of concordance and discordance developed by the emplotment of action. The dialectic consists in the fact that, following the line of concordance, the character draws his or her singularity from the unity of a life considered a temporal totality which is itself singular and distinguished from all others. Following the line of discordance, this temporal totality is threatened by the disruptive effect of the unforseeable events that punctuate it (encounters, accidents, etc.). Because of the concordant discordant synthesis, the contingency of the event contributes to the necessity, retroactive so to speak, of the history of a life, to which is equated the identify of the character. Thus chance is transmuted into fate. And the identity of the character emploted, so to speak, can be understood only in terms of this dialectic. The thesis of identity which Parfit calls nonreductionist receives more than an assist from this dialectic, something more like a complete overhaul. The person , understood as a character in a story, is not an entity distinct from his or her ‘experiences.’ Quite the opposite: the person shares the condition of dynamic identity peculiar to the story recounted. The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character.

This dialectic of discordant concordance belonging to the character must now be inscribed within the dialectic of sameness and of selfhood. The necessity of this reinscription imposes itself as soon as the discordant concordance of the character is confronted with the search for permanence in time attached to the notion of identity, a confrontation that brings out the equivocalness we made apparent in the preceding study: on one side, we said, there is the sameness of character; on the other, the ipseity, or selfhood, of self-constancy. We have now to show how the dialectic of the character comes to be inscribed in the interval between these two poles of permanence in time in order to mediate between them.

This mediating function performed by the narrative identity of the character between the poles of sameness and selfhood is attested to primarily by the imaginative variations to which the narrative submits this identity. In truth, the narrative does not merely tolerate these variations, it engenders them, seeks them out. In this sense, literature proves to consist in a vast laboratory for thought experiments in which the resources of variation encompassed by narrative identity are put to the test of narration. The benefit of these thought experiments lies in the fact that they make the difference between the two meanings of permanence in time evident, by varying the relation between then. In every day experience, as we have said, these meanings tend to overlap and to merge with one another; in this way, counting on someone is both relying on the stability of character and expecting that the other will keep his or her word, regardless of the changes that may affect the lasting dispositions by which that person is recognized” (Ricoeur 1994:147-148).

Ricoeur, Paul
1994[1990] Oneself as Another. Kathleen Blamey, trans. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

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Mlabri Nation-Vanishing Identity

“The Mlabri in Thailand travel across the forest with ease to visit other Mlabri. There are two areas in which they live, one area is in Nan Province and the other is in Phrae Province. Traditionally, they traveled in small bands comprised of three to four families each seeking food and safety. They had no problem with the identification of who they are. Their language, customs, knowledge and even their blood all told them about their identity. The idea of a nation bounded by internationally recognized borders does not fit their history or even their present day status. They are more akin to the First Americans who to this day identify themselves by nation. But the question now asked is: Can they remain who they were without changing their identity? I believer the answer is, “no, they cannot remain who they were unless a part of them changes.” Then, if this case, to what extent can they be considered a nation, or in civic parlance, a community? Apart from issues of nomenclature, the important point here is that a group of people live in more than one world at the same time with little opportunity to come into parity with any of the others in their world- such as the government, other people groups–Thai and Hmong, or the missionaries. Identity based in the traditional concept of the individual does not have the authenticity or depth to help us think about who we are in today’s transidentified world.

The Mlabri do not refer to themselves as belonging to a country as much as to a group of people. The Mlabri are in a sense a transnational community over three countries. This community resides as much in the memory of the Mlabri as it does on various kinds of land. Some of the land belongs to the Thai government, some is the personal property of Hmong farmers, and still other land is part of sparsely populated forest areas in Laos and northern Burma. The boundaries of the physical land lack definition and are highly porous. More accurately, the Mlabri reside in their memory and imagination which are the source of any future for them if they are to retain aspects of their identity and not completely vanish physically and culturally. To repeat, identity is not individual, rather our concept of self is evidenced only within the context of others. Hence, the Mlabri, and all others, take on identity only in relationship to others. Because our identity is centered in relationship to others, there is a dual nature in what we traditionally identify as individual identity. Herein enters Paul Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity in which two natures of the self can be held together authentically through emplotment—the bringing together in ways that make sense of the concordance and discordance in our life.

Stories about ourselves hold the contradictions, sufferings, hopes, the past, and the imagined future in a plot that allows us to make sense of our lives. Each of us has two aspects to our identity in order for this sense to come alive. Ricoeur argues (1992) that the self is constituted by an idem-identity and ipse-identity – the idem aspect of our identity is that part that remains the same over time. It is our character.

Yet over time, a person changes which reflects the ipse aspect of our self. We hold both the permanent sense and the transitory sense of self in a narrative identity. The stories that the Mlabri tell of their past are also found in the stories they tell about their present. How anyone imagines their lives to be in the future requires the wakening of the social imagery housed in each of us. Without reflecting on our past to find those very elements of our lives that did not come to bear, there is no future. In other words, the future is housed in the reawakening of our memories” (Herda 2007).

Herda, Ellen
2007 Mlabri Nation Vanishing: Horizons of Social Imagery in Development. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, May (CD-ROM proceedings).

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