“From this correlation between action and character in a narrative there results a dialectic internal to the character which is the exact corollary of the dialectic of concordance and discordance developed by the emplotment of action. The dialectic consists in the fact that, following the line of concordance, the character draws his or her singularity from the unity of a life considered a temporal totality which is itself singular and distinguished from all others. Following the line of discordance, this temporal totality is threatened by the disruptive effect of the unforseeable events that punctuate it (encounters, accidents, etc.). Because of the concordant discordant synthesis, the contingency of the event contributes to the necessity, retroactive so to speak, of the history of a life, to which is equated the identify of the character. Thus chance is transmuted into fate. And the identity of the character emploted, so to speak, can be understood only in terms of this dialectic. The thesis of identity which Parfit calls nonreductionist receives more than an assist from this dialectic, something more like a complete overhaul. The person , understood as a character in a story, is not an entity distinct from his or her ‘experiences.’ Quite the opposite: the person shares the condition of dynamic identity peculiar to the story recounted. The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character.
This dialectic of discordant concordance belonging to the character must now be inscribed within the dialectic of sameness and of selfhood. The necessity of this reinscription imposes itself as soon as the discordant concordance of the character is confronted with the search for permanence in time attached to the notion of identity, a confrontation that brings out the equivocalness we made apparent in the preceding study: on one side, we said, there is the sameness of character; on the other, the ipseity, or selfhood, of self-constancy. We have now to show how the dialectic of the character comes to be inscribed in the interval between these two poles of permanence in time in order to mediate between them.
This mediating function performed by the narrative identity of the character between the poles of sameness and selfhood is attested to primarily by the imaginative variations to which the narrative submits this identity. In truth, the narrative does not merely tolerate these variations, it engenders them, seeks them out. In this sense, literature proves to consist in a vast laboratory for thought experiments in which the resources of variation encompassed by narrative identity are put to the test of narration. The benefit of these thought experiments lies in the fact that they make the difference between the two meanings of permanence in time evident, by varying the relation between then. In every day experience, as we have said, these meanings tend to overlap and to merge with one another; in this way, counting on someone is both relying on the stability of character and expecting that the other will keep his or her word, regardless of the changes that may affect the lasting dispositions by which that person is recognized” (Ricoeur 1994:147-148).
Ricoeur, Paul
1994[1990] Oneself as Another. Kathleen Blamey, trans. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
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