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Ricoeur, Speech-Act Theory, and the Gospels as History (Stiver, 2001)

"With this general backdrop of Ricoeur’s approach to humans as thoroughly interpretive or hermeneutical beings, we can see the significance of Ricoeur's understanding both history and fiction in Time and Narrative as imaginative enterprises, both as acts of creative configuration and 'emplotment'. Rather than facing each other across a continental divide, the one representing positivistic fact and the other the flight of the imagination into the unreal, history and fiction are both fundamentally alike in being 'mimetic' of reality. They are both fundamentally hermeneutical projects. His first move, therefore, was to join together what modernity had cast asunder, which especially involved a transformation of the nature of historiography. It is now much more readily recognized that it was a century ago that historiography is itself a work of the productive imagination, representing a particular cast on a time and place. The surplus of meaning that Ricoeur emphasizes with respect to fiction is also at play in historiography, to which any dispute between historians attests. Ricoeur's hermeneutical 'principle of plenitude' applies to historiography — namely, a text or an event means all that it can mean!

Fiction and historiography both unfold, he believes, in terms of what he calls a threefold mimesis. Mimesis1 represents the prefigured way of being-in-the-world that we bring to any text. Mimesis2 is the creative configuration of a text. Mimesis3 is the appropriative refiguration of a text that involves what Gadamer calls a 'fusion of horizons'. Ricoeur's 'narrative arc', like his earlier hermeneutical arc, challenges the traditional hermeneutic conception that application is an optional third step beyond understanding and explanation. Rather, it is an integral aspect of any hermeneutical act. As he says, 'We are not allowed to exclude the final act of personal commitment from the whole of objective and explanatory procedures which mediate it.'

Ricoeur earlier distinguished the world of the text as the sense of the text and the application as the reference of the text. Although in Time and Narrative he has become uncomfortable with this language borrowed from quite a different domain, he retained the idea that the text has an inherent referential dimension. Regarding his preoccupation with structuralism in the 1970s, which he characteristically both affirmed and rejected, he argued that structural analysis has a place as a critical methodology, but its insistence on remaining within the field of meaning of the text itself means that 'it would be reduced to a sterile game, a divisive algebra'. Ricoeur's point may be understood utilizing Gadamer's notion of a fusion of horizons. Gadamer argued that it is not possible to distinguish wholly between our horizon and the horizon of the text. In the parlance of biblical studies, he rejected the sharp distinction between what a text meant and what it means. Rather, any act of understanding involves a creative fusion of horizons, whether we agree with the text or not. 'It is not enough,' Gadamer says, 'to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.' Even the understanding necessary to reject vehemently the meaning of a text involves a fusion of horizons. An aspect of bringing our horizon to the text is some nascent sense of what it might mean to appropriate the text in our horizon. We can of course distinguish relatively between the meaning of a text and our appropriation of it, but some sense of its significance is inherent in our understanding of it in the first place. Ricoeur thus posits a dynamic interrelationship between the world of the text and the world in front of the text — that is, the latter as the meaning of the text as I have appropriated it" (Stiver, 2001 p. 57-59).

Stiver, Dan R. Ricoeur (2001). Ricoeur, speech-act theory, and the gospels as history. In Bartholomew, C. G., Greene, C. J. D., & Möller, K. (Eds.), After Pentecost: Language and biblical interpretation. Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster Press.

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Hermeneutics as Meta-Critique

“The unsurpassable concept of the fusion of horizons endows the theory of prejudice with its most peculiar characteristic: prejudice is the horizon of the present, the finitude of what is near in its openness towards the remote. This relation between the self and the other gives the concept of prejudice its final dialectical touch: only insofar as I place myself in the other’s point of view do I confront myself with my present horizon, with my prejudices. It is only in the tension between the other and the self, between the text of the past and the point of view of the reader, that prejudice becomes operative and constitutive of historicity.

The epistemological implications of the ontological concept of historical efficacy are easy to discern. They concern the very status of research in the social sciences: that is what Gadamer wanted to show. Forschung-inquiry-scientific research does not escape the historical consciousness of those who live and make history. Historical knowledge cannot free itself from the historical condition. It follows that the project of a science free from prejudices is impossible. History poses meaningful questions to the past, pursues meaningful research and attains meaningful results only by being from a tradition which interpellates it. The emphasis on the word Bedeutung [meaning] leaves no doubt: history as science receives its meanings, at the outset, as well as the end of research, from the link which it preserves with a received and recognized tradition. The action of tradition and historical investigation are fused by a bond which no critical consciousness could dissolve without rendering the research itself nonsensical. The history of the historians (historie) can only bring to a higher level of consciousness the very flow of life within history (Geschichte): ‘Modern historical research itself is not only research, but the transmission of tradition’. Man’s link to the past precedes and envelops the purely objective treatment of historical facts. It remains to be seen whether the ideal of unlimited and unconstrained communication, which Habermas opposes to the concept of tradition, escapes from Gadamer’s argument against the possibility of a complete knowledge of history and, along with it, of history as an object in itself. Whatever the outcome of this argument against the critique of ideology, hermeneutics ultimately claims to set itself up as a critique of critique, or a meta-critique” (Ricoeur 1998:75-76).

Ricoeur, Paul
1998[1981] Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. John B. Thompson, ed. & trans. Paris: Cambridge University Press.

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