"In the tragic awareness of a supposedly irreconcilable conflict between justice for all and the individual good, the realization of political equality should remain 'an object of hope and striving.' Evidently, this is not intended in the trivial sense of an ineradicable difference between norm and reality but rather in the deeper metaphysical sense of the recognition of the 'impossibility of any guarantee of successful completion.' In Rawl's theory, too, the 'pending state [Im-Kommen_Sein] of justice' can be demonstrated and hence the insight that the 'reign of justice becomes independent of the subjective implementation of justice.' In Hegelian terms, the causality of fate retains the upper hand over abstract justice — only now, of course, no longer in the name of a surpassing objective or even absolute reason.
A conception of political justice cannot remain neutral in the sense that it lacks any normative content, even if the corresponding constitutional principles take the form of procedures for legitimately making and applying the law. For the just political order Rawls claims (1) the 'neutrality of aim' in relation to the ethical forms of life and worldviews common in civil society, but no (2) the 'neutrality of effect or influence' that individual norms and measures have on different cultural groups. Under both of these aspects, Menke believes that he can show that the conditions of possibility for an egalitarian-universalistic constitutional order turn out in an aporetic way to be conditions of the impossibility of its realization" (Habermas 2009:282-283).
Habermas, Jürgen
2009[2005] Between Naturalism and Religion. Ciaran Cronin, trans. Cambridge, Polity Press.
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