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Praxis and Ideology

25/06/2011 By Kelly Cooper

"If we want a Marxist theory of ideology… we must first make sense of the distinction between relations and forces. This means that we need a concept of praxis. In the vocabulary of Habermas, praxis includes both instrumental action and the structure of symbolic interaction. Ideology will appear as a distortion affecting one of the components of praxis. For Habermas, the concept of praxis is an attempt to recover the density of the Fichtean concept of action (Tathandlung) within a Marxist vocabulary. Labor is the source of synthesis, but human labor is always more than instrumental action because we cannot work without bringing in our traditions and our symbolic interpretation of the world. Our work also includes the institutional framework of society, because our work is defined by contrasts and other stipulations. When we work, we work within a system of conventions. We cannot define praxis only in terms of the labor techniques that we apply. Our praxis itself incorporates a certain institutional framework. Once again we see that the distinction between super-structure and infrastructure is not appropriate, because we include something of the so-called superstructure within the concept of praxis. We have then a complete reshaping of the vocabulary ordinarily used to describe praxis. We can no longer say that people first have a praxis and then have some ideas about that praxis, which is their ideology. Instead, we see that praxis incorporates an ideological layer; this layer may become distorted, but it is a component of praxis itself" (Ricoeur 1986:223).

Ricoeur, Paul
1984 Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. George H. Taylor, ed. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Text and the Reader

11/06/2011 By Kelly Cooper

"His [Ricoeur's] second claim, also supported in his book on metaphor, is that literary works bring our experience to language. Thus, those who by methodological decision want to refer to a 'referential illusion' have not thereby abolished the problem of the relationship between literature and the world of the reader. Using Gadamer's expression, Ricoeur says that 'reading poses anew the problem of the fusion of two horizons, that of the text and that of the reader, and hence the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the reader.'. In the case of metaphor, the literal nonsense of the sentence which appears meaningless, and therefore incapable of referring to anything, is overcome by the new, metaphoric meaning which brings with it a new reference. Poetic texts as well as descriptive texts have the power to redescribe the world. What the interpretation of a text gives us is a possible world in which we could live. If we include narrative reference under the general heading of poetic reference, then a third problem arises. Narrative reference is at once similar and more complex than poetic reference. It is simpler because in narrative the world is seen through the lens of human action. According to mimesis2, narratives configure a world of action. And, a preunderstanding of action is presupposed. So, if in a broad sense narratives refer to the world of 'praxis' or human action, then the referential relationship is easier to understand. On the other hand, the referential relationship between text and the world is complicated by the truth-claims of some kinds of narrative— especially historical narratives— which are lacking in poetic works. Put simply, the referential modes of history and function are quite asymmetric" (Reagan 1995:333-334).

Reagan, Charles E.
1995 Words and Deeds: The Semantics of Action. In The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. Pp. 332-345. Chicago, IL: Open Court.

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Habermas on Phronesis

27/05/2011 By Kelly Cooper

"Focusing on Aristotle and Hobbes, Habermas contrasts the classical and the modern conceptions of politics. The 'old doctrine of politics' has become alien to us in three respects. First, 'politics was understood to be the doctrine of the good and just life; it was the continuation of ethics. Aristotle saw no opposition between the constitution formulated in the nomoi and the ethos of civil life; conversely, the ethical character of action was not separable from custom and law. Only the politeia makes the citizen capable of the good life; and his is altogether a zoon politikon, in the sense that he is dependent on the city, the polis, for the realization of human nature' (TP, p. 42.).

Second, 'the old doctrine of politics referred exclusively to praxis in the narrow sense of the Greeks. This had nothing to do with techne, the skillful production of artifacts and expert mastery of objectified tasks. In the final instance, politics was always directed toward the formation and cultivation of character; it proceeded pedagogically and not technically' (TP, p. 42).21

Third, 'Aristotle emphasizes that politics, and practical philosophy in general, cannot be compared in its claim to knowledge with rigorous science or with apodictic episteme. For its subject matter, the Just and the Excellent in its context of a variable and contingent praxis, lacks ontological constancy as well as logical necessity. The capacity of practical philosophy is phronesis, a prudent understanding of the situation, and on this the tradition of a classical politics has continued to base itself, by way of the prudentia of Cicero, down to Burke's "prudence"' (TP, p. 42.)" (Bernstein 1995 :185-186).

Bernstein, Richard J.
1995[1976] The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennsylvania Press.

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Praxis and Political Freedom

21/02/2011 By Kelly Cooper

“Like Gadamer, Arendt sees that the essential feature of the type of reasoning appropriate to praxis is the ability to do justice to particular situations in their particularity. She is just as skeptical as he is of any model of practical reasoning that identifies it with the subsumption of particulars to general rules or universals. This is what draws her to Kant’s analysis of reflective judgment, which Kant contrasted with the type of subsumption of particulars characteristic of determinative judgment. Like Gadamer, she seeks to show the importance of taste as a communal civic sense, a sensus communis that is basic for aesthetics, understanding, and politics. Her analysis of judgment as an intrinsically political mode of thinking is also motivated by the desire to show how this mode of thinking escapes the dichotomy of objectivism and relativism. Judgment is not the expression of private feelings or idiosyncratic subjective preferences. Neither is it to be identified with the type of universality that she takes to be characteristic of ‘cognitive reason.’ Judgment is communal and intersubjective; it always implicitly appeals to and requires testing against the opinions of other judging persons. It is not a faculty of Man in his universality, but of human individuals in their particularity and plurality.

Many of the most significant differences between Gadamer and Arendt can be related to the different roles that the interpretation of Aristotle and Kant play in their thinking. When Gadamer wants to show us ‘what practice really means,’ he turns to Aristotle’s analysis of phronesis. But although Arendt was deeply influenced by Aristotle, it is Kant-The Kant of the Critique of Judgment-who is the source of her analysis of judgment. Ironically, Gadamer sees the Critique of Judgment as the decisive text for encouraging the rise of ‘aesthetic consciousness’ and the modern subjectivism that he deplores, while Arendt interprets the Critique of Judgment as pointing to a way beyond this modern subjectivism.

This difference is consequential for their differing understanding of action and politics. While Gadamer asserts the crucial role of dialogue, conversation, and questioning, he does so, as we have seen, primarily in the context of a dialogue with works of art, texts, and tradition-which he then extends to the practical and political sphere. But when he makes this subtle shift, the very meaning and weight of these key concepts undergo an important shift of emphasis. A dialogue or conversation among individuals (as Gadamer acknowledges) must be based on mutual respect, equality, a willingness to listen and to risks one’s prejudices and opinions. Arendt’s analysis of action helps to bring into sharp focus the radical implications of Gadamer’s analysis.

This even has consequences for their differing understandings of authority. Arendt agrees with Gadamer that authority ‘precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used authority itself has failed.’ But she also goes on to say that

authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance. Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical. If authority is to be defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments.

In this respect, then, Arendt is much closer to Habermas and the types of criticisms he presses against Gadamer.

The differences between Arendt and Gadamer stand out especially clearly when we realize that whereas for Gadamer the key concept is tradition, for Arendt it is revolution-or more specifically the ‘revolutionary spirit’ which attempts to found public freedom. While she realizes that the revolutionary spirit always appeals to tradition, what is most important for her is its spontaneous quality, rooted in human natality. And it is with the appearance of this revolutionary spirit in the modern age that we find those experiences that have ‘exemplary validity’ for the type of debate, mutual participation, and persuasion that Gadamer himself makes so essential for political reason. Both see the principle of public freedom as being fundamental for the modern project. But whereas this theme is barely developed in Gadamer, it becomes the major motif in Arendt’s analysis of praxis” (Bernstein 1983:219-220).

Bernstein, Richard J.
1983 Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

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