post

Ricoeur, Speech-Act Theory, and the Gospels as History (Stiver, 2001)

"With this general backdrop of Ricoeur’s approach to humans as thoroughly interpretive or hermeneutical beings, we can see the significance of Ricoeur's understanding both history and fiction in Time and Narrative as imaginative enterprises, both as acts of creative configuration and 'emplotment'. Rather than facing each other across a continental divide, the one representing positivistic fact and the other the flight of the imagination into the unreal, history and fiction are both fundamentally alike in being 'mimetic' of reality. They are both fundamentally hermeneutical projects. His first move, therefore, was to join together what modernity had cast asunder, which especially involved a transformation of the nature of historiography. It is now much more readily recognized that it was a century ago that historiography is itself a work of the productive imagination, representing a particular cast on a time and place. The surplus of meaning that Ricoeur emphasizes with respect to fiction is also at play in historiography, to which any dispute between historians attests. Ricoeur's hermeneutical 'principle of plenitude' applies to historiography — namely, a text or an event means all that it can mean!

Fiction and historiography both unfold, he believes, in terms of what he calls a threefold mimesis. Mimesis1 represents the prefigured way of being-in-the-world that we bring to any text. Mimesis2 is the creative configuration of a text. Mimesis3 is the appropriative refiguration of a text that involves what Gadamer calls a 'fusion of horizons'. Ricoeur's 'narrative arc', like his earlier hermeneutical arc, challenges the traditional hermeneutic conception that application is an optional third step beyond understanding and explanation. Rather, it is an integral aspect of any hermeneutical act. As he says, 'We are not allowed to exclude the final act of personal commitment from the whole of objective and explanatory procedures which mediate it.'

Ricoeur earlier distinguished the world of the text as the sense of the text and the application as the reference of the text. Although in Time and Narrative he has become uncomfortable with this language borrowed from quite a different domain, he retained the idea that the text has an inherent referential dimension. Regarding his preoccupation with structuralism in the 1970s, which he characteristically both affirmed and rejected, he argued that structural analysis has a place as a critical methodology, but its insistence on remaining within the field of meaning of the text itself means that 'it would be reduced to a sterile game, a divisive algebra'. Ricoeur's point may be understood utilizing Gadamer's notion of a fusion of horizons. Gadamer argued that it is not possible to distinguish wholly between our horizon and the horizon of the text. In the parlance of biblical studies, he rejected the sharp distinction between what a text meant and what it means. Rather, any act of understanding involves a creative fusion of horizons, whether we agree with the text or not. 'It is not enough,' Gadamer says, 'to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.' Even the understanding necessary to reject vehemently the meaning of a text involves a fusion of horizons. An aspect of bringing our horizon to the text is some nascent sense of what it might mean to appropriate the text in our horizon. We can of course distinguish relatively between the meaning of a text and our appropriation of it, but some sense of its significance is inherent in our understanding of it in the first place. Ricoeur thus posits a dynamic interrelationship between the world of the text and the world in front of the text — that is, the latter as the meaning of the text as I have appropriated it" (Stiver, 2001 p. 57-59).

Stiver, Dan R. Ricoeur (2001). Ricoeur, speech-act theory, and the gospels as history. In Bartholomew, C. G., Greene, C. J. D., & Möller, K. (Eds.), After Pentecost: Language and biblical interpretation. Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster Press.

Citation Style APA

post

Text and the Reader

"His [Ricoeur's] second claim, also supported in his book on metaphor, is that literary works bring our experience to language. Thus, those who by methodological decision want to refer to a 'referential illusion' have not thereby abolished the problem of the relationship between literature and the world of the reader. Using Gadamer's expression, Ricoeur says that 'reading poses anew the problem of the fusion of two horizons, that of the text and that of the reader, and hence the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the reader.'. In the case of metaphor, the literal nonsense of the sentence which appears meaningless, and therefore incapable of referring to anything, is overcome by the new, metaphoric meaning which brings with it a new reference. Poetic texts as well as descriptive texts have the power to redescribe the world. What the interpretation of a text gives us is a possible world in which we could live. If we include narrative reference under the general heading of poetic reference, then a third problem arises. Narrative reference is at once similar and more complex than poetic reference. It is simpler because in narrative the world is seen through the lens of human action. According to mimesis2, narratives configure a world of action. And, a preunderstanding of action is presupposed. So, if in a broad sense narratives refer to the world of 'praxis' or human action, then the referential relationship is easier to understand. On the other hand, the referential relationship between text and the world is complicated by the truth-claims of some kinds of narrative— especially historical narratives— which are lacking in poetic works. Put simply, the referential modes of history and function are quite asymmetric" (Reagan 1995:333-334).

Reagan, Charles E.
1995 Words and Deeds: The Semantics of Action. In The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. Pp. 332-345. Chicago, IL: Open Court.

Citation Style AAA

post

Hermeneutics and its Critique of a Positivist Unity of Science

"For both Habermas and Apel the importance of hermeneutics lies in its critique of a positivist 'unity of science' that attempts to reduce all forms of knowledge to the model of the natural sciences. On their view, Gadamer’s merit is to have provided an account of hermeneutic understanding that both indicates the extent to which it deviates from natural scientific explanation and justifies it as an unavoidable component of social scientific inquiry. In this regard, Gadamer’s insights into effective history and the force of prejudice are crucial. They show the way in which all forms of knowledge adhere to a set of historically produced norms and conventions and hence the naivety of the claim that the natural sciences provide an unconditioned 'objective' view of their subject-matter which it is the task of the social sciences to emulate. Moreover, these insights indicate an important difference between the natural and the social sciences in so far as they reveal the 'double hermeneutic' characteristic of the latter, which Gadamer describes as an encounter or dialogue between two sets of prejudices or historical horizons. The successful conclusion of such dialogue is a mutual understanding of the subject-matter at issue that goes beyond both the views of one’s text or text-analogue and one’s own initial assumptions, prejudices and aims. In stressing this new understanding, Gadamer’s hermeneutics attempts to move beyond both the conservatism of simply adopting the views of the 'text' and the subjectivism of interpreting it as a verification of one's own prejudices. Hermeneutic understanding rather participates in the self-formation of an interpretive tradition in which each new effort to understand reflects a new education and a new form of the tradition itself.

Both Habermas and Apel criticize this analysis of tradition for its failure to reflect on the possibility of ideological distortion within the tradition's self-formation. …the problem they see is really two-fold. On the one hand, that which we are trying to understand may systematically obscure its connections to social relations of power and domination. Hence, in appropriating it hermeneutically as possibly true we may deform our own development, as, it could be argued, women did. On the other hand, our own understanding—that is the way we appropriate or take seriously that which we are trying to understand—may itself reflect the influence of ideology. In this case, what we learn from others will be deformed by the very language and categories in terms of which we understand it" (Warnke 1987:139-140).

Warnke, Georgia
1987 Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Citation Style AAA

Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason (Key Contemporary Thinkers) at Amazon.com

post

Understanding Always Involves Interpretation

"When we truly converse, we understand and interpret at once. Both English words correctly translate Gadamer's key term Verstehen. The German word covers not just the act of insight but also the act of articulation or Auslegung by which we talk to ourselves, laying out in language what we actually understand. 'Interpretation belongs to the essential unity of understanding. Whatever is said to us must be so received by us that it speaks and finds a response in our own words and in our own language'.

Understanding always involves interpretation, and this is preeminently true in understanding texts:

Whoever wants to understand a text always performs a projection. We project a meaning of the whole, as soon as a first meaning is manifest in the text. Such a meaning in turn only becomes manifest because one is already reading the text with certain expectations of a determinate meaning. Understanding what is there to be understood consists in working out such a projection which of course is constantly revised by what emerges in penetrating its meaning further…. [A]ny revision of the projection exists in virtue of the possibility of casting up a new projection;… rival projections towards the elaboration can be generated one after the other, until the unity of sense if fixed unequivocally;… the interpretation is initiated with anticipatory notions that are replaced by more adequate ones: precisely this ongoing newly-projecting that constitutes the movement of meaning proper to understanding and interpreting is the process that Heidegger describes.

Whenever we read a text 'there is no author present at the discussion as an answering partner, and no subject matter present which can be so or otherwise. The text as a work stands on its own.' Does this mean there is no dialogue? Not at all.

It seems that here is the dialectic of question and answer, in so far as it has any place at all, is only available in one direction, which means from the side of the one seeking to understand the work of art, who questions it and who is called into question by it, and who tries to listen for the answer of the work. As the person one is, one may, just like anyone thinking, be the inquirer and responder at once, in the same manner as happens in a real conversation between two people. But this dialogue of the understanding reader with himself surely does not seem to be a dialogue with the text, which is fixed and to that extent is finished. Or is this really how it is? Or is there an already finished text given at all?

"(Dostal 2002:186-187).

Dostal, Robert J., ed.
2002 The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Citation Style AAA

The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy) at Amazon.com

post

Ricoeur on Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy

"To speak, do, recount, impute are, by turns, the first analogon of the series of figures of acting, as a function of what Kant would have called an interest of reason that is different in each case. Speaking is the first analogon inasmuch as it is within a symbolic, hence verbal, setting that all other modalities of acting get determined. The philosophy of action is, in its analytic phase, a semantics of action sentences, and, in its reflective phase, an investigation of ways of speaking of oneself as an agent, ways of recognizing oneself verbally as the author of one’s own acts; narration is speaking par excellence, discourse and text; and moral imputation is spoken through the features of a special kind of attribution, an 'ascription' joining imputed action to the responsible agent.

However, doing can no less claim the role of the first analogon: 'Doing things with words' (to recall the well-known title of J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words). And recounting is doing, we must add, by conferring the coherence of a narrative on the cohesion of a life. This recounting, in turn, can also occupy the place of the first analogon once the question of the permanence of the self in time is brought forward, whether in the field of speaking and acting, or in that of the 'ascription' of acts to their agent.

Moral imputation, too, can be taken as the first analogon in the series of connotations of acting. What would the self-designation of a speaker signify if the sincerity of his or her saying were not assumed by the audience? Could an agent be taken to be the author of his/her acts if he did not declare himself of herself ready to be judged accountable for them before a tribunal of evaluation, of approbation, in short of moral judgment?

It is upon this analogy of acting, finally, that I try to graft an attempt to reappropriate the Aristotelian connotation of being as act and potentiality. I do not wish to conceal the difficult character of this reappropriation, more or less animated by the idea of taking this connotation of being as the first principle of a discourse about acting, one that finds articulations, on the level of a philosophical anthropology, that fit well with the style of a hermeneutic phenomenology. This reappropriation I am attempting is doubly difficult. It is so, first of all, because of the perplexities engendered by any archeological reading of the dunamis-energeia pair in Aristotle himself, whether it be a matter of the direct commentaries on Metaphysics A 12 and even more so O–the fragment 0 6 1048b 18-35 has especially fascinated me, just as it had drawn the attention of the best commentators before me, such as Remi Brague in his Aristote et la question du monde (Paris: P.U.F., 1988y-or if it be a question of the attempted reconstructions of the tie between the ontology of potentiality and act and the concept of praxis as it is set forth in the Nichomachean Ethics. Any reappropriation of this ontology of act and potentiality is made still more difficult by the detour) attempted before me by F. Volpi in his Heidegger e Aristotele and by Jacques Taminaux in his Lectures del (ontologie fondamentale, Essai sur Heidegger) through the Heideggerian concept of Care. This detour gives rise, in fact, to a problematic displacement due to the fact of being transferred from an ontology stemming from a preference for being as truth to one that accords priority to being as act and potentiality among the multiple connotations of being as being."

Ricoeur, P. (1996). From metaphysics to moral philosophy. Philosophy Today, 40(4), 443. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/205363795?accountid=28180

Citation Style APA